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Abstract: In this paper we highlight the importance of the operational costs in explaining 
economic growth and analyze how the industrial structure affects the growth rate of the 
economy. If there is monopolistic competition only in an intermediate goods sector, then 
production growth coincides with consumption growth. Moreover, the pattern of growth 
depends on the particular form of the operational cost. If the monopolistically competitive 
sector is the final goods sector, then per capita production is constant but per capita 
effective consumption or welfare grows. Finally, we modify again the industrial structure 
of the economy and show an economy with two different growth speeds, one for 
production and another for effective consumption. Thus, both the operational cost and the 
particular structure of the sector that produces the final goods determines ultimately the 
pattern of growth. 
JEL Classification: O40, O41, O47 
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Resum: En aquest article, es fa èmfasi en la importància dels costos operacionals en 
explicar el creixement econòmic i s’analitza com l’estructura industrial afecta la taxa de 
creixement de l’economia. Si només hi ha competència monopolística en sectors de béns 
intermedis, aleshores el creixement de la producció coincideix amb el creixement del 
consum. A més, l’esquema de creixement, endogen o semi-endogen, depèn de la forma 
particular del cost operacional. Si el sector on es produeix la competència monopolística és 
la de béns finals, aleshores la producció per càpita és constant però el consum per càpita 
efectiu o benestar creix. Finalment, si es modifica un altre cop l’estructura industrial de 
l’economia, es té una economia amb dos velocitats de creixement diferents, una per la 
producció i l’altre pel consum efectiu. Es conclou doncs que tant els costos operacionals 
com l’estructura particular del sector que produeix els béns finals determinen en últim 
terme l’esquema de creixement. 
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze growth in an economy with monopolistic competition char-
acterized by the presence of operational costs. To this end, we first present a reduced
model to show that the popular growth models based on R&D are specific cases of
this reduced model. The growth source is simply the growth of the number of firms
or goods in the economy, which is directly related to the opportunity of having
profits. Second, we introduce microfoundations into the reduced model and analyze
the relationship between the firms growth mechanism and the pattern of growth.
In this part, and as the current models of economic growth, there is monopolistic
competition only in an intermediate goods sector, and production growth coincides
with consumption growth. Third, we modify the industrial structure of the economy
by considering monopolistic competition in the final goods sector, and describe an
economy where per capita production is constant but per capita eﬀective consump-
tion or welfare experiences growth. The economy seems to be at a standstill but
individuals are better oﬀ. Finally, we show an economy with two diﬀerent growth
speeds, one for production and another for eﬀective consumption.
The growth models based on R&D have a common property: there is an inter-
mediate goods sector. A firm of this sector is the only producer of one intermediate
good, what confers to it a certain degree of market power and, hence, positive prof-
its. These profits are used to rent a patent, which in turn guarantees to the firm
that it can produce and, moreover, it is the only producer of the good. Therefore,
the existence of a sector with positive profits is necessary for R&D to arise. Other-
wise, no economic agent would devote any amount of resources to engage in an R&D
activity. This mechanism reveals that a requirement for growth to arise is not neces-
sarily R&D, but profits. A patent is a type of operational cost, i.e., a cost that does
not depend on the quantity produced but, at the same time, production cannot be
engaged if this cost is not supported. Moreover, the operational cost is necessary to
fix the number of intermediate firms. Therefore, any economy with a sector in which
firms have both market power and an operational cost can experience growth. The
pattern of growth will be determined by the specific type of operational cost. The
rationale is that the existence of a free entry condition causes that the operational
cost ultimately determines both the number of firms and the quantity of capital and
labor per firm and, thus, growth.
In section 2, we show the influence of the operational cost and the number of
firms on growth through a reduced model of monopolistic competition. The reduced
model allows to compare growth rates by considering an ad-hoc rule that fixes the
number of intermediate firms. In particular, by assuming a constant operational
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cost and fixing the evolution of firms as a linear function of both labor and the
number of firms, we obtain the results of Romer (1990): endogenous growth with
scale eﬀects. Constant population is required for a balanced growth path to exist.
Instead, by assuming an operational cost that is linear in total population and an
evolution of firms that does depend non linearly on both labor and the number of
firms, we obtain the results of Jones (1995): semiendogenous growth, i.e., there is
growth if and only if there is population growth. The reduced model sheds light on
the necessity in Jones (1995) of the operational cost to depend on total population
instead of the workers employed by a firm, which denotes some type of scale eﬀect.
We endogeneize the number of firms in order to deepen into the relationship
between growth and operational costs in section 3. We depart from the model pro-
posed by Coto-Martínez, Garriga and Sánchez-Losada (2007), where the number
of firms or varieties is endogenous. The economy has two sectors: an intermediate
goods sector with monopolistically competitive firms, and a competitive final goods
sector where the firms combine the intermediate goods à la Dixit-Stiglitz. However,
it is taken into consideration the formulation proposed by Ethier (1982) or Benassy
(1996) that separates the returns to specialization from the monopolistic mark-up.
Moreover, and in contrast with Romer (1990) and Jones (1995), the monopolistically
competitive sector uses labor as a production input. In this type of economy, the en-
trance of a new firm in the market has two opposite eﬀects on the incumbent firms:
a complementary eﬀect and a business-stealing eﬀect. When a new firm enters the
market, it does not take into account the positive eﬀect on aggregate productivity,
which increases the demand of the incumbent firms. This is the complementary
eﬀect. Moreover, at the same time the presence of a new intermediate firm means
that the final good producers can choose among a greater variety of (partially sub-
stitutable) inputs, which decreases the demand of the incumbent firms. This is the
business-stealing eﬀect. The nature and evolution of the operational cost plays a
crucial role in the determination of each eﬀect and, thus, on the incentives for new
firms to entry.
In this paper we consider an operational cost function that depends on the past
history by assuming that these costs depend on how production has been organized
in the past. This implies that since the production function does not vary, no firm
will change its operational behavior if it implies a higher operational cost.1 We as-
sume an operational cost function such that only more capital intensive firms may
improve the operational technology and induce growth. With this cost structure, we
show that endogenous growth is characterized by some knife-edge condition:2 the
1Future research should address the case where a higher operational cost is associated with an
improvement of the total factor productivity of the production function.
2Growiec (2007) defines “a knife-edge condition as a condition imposed on parameter values
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economy experiences endogenous growth only when the operational cost is asymp-
totically linear in the capital per firm. Otherwise, population growth is required to
grow. We pay special attention to two particular cases that illustrate the importance
of the operational costs. First, we assume that the operational cost is constant and
independent of the quantity produced, as in Matsuyama (1995). Examples are fixed
maintenance costs, managerial costs, or simply entry barriers as advertising. In this
case, there is no mechanism to induce grow other than population growth. With
constant population the complementary eﬀect compensates the business-stealing ef-
fect and, therefore, there is no incentive for a new firm to enter the market. Instead,
population growth translates into economic growth through the growth of the num-
ber of firms. When labor supply grows, the wage decreases in the short run, which
alleviates the business-stealing eﬀect and causes the complementary eﬀect to rein-
force entry, implying that in the long run labor demand increases. As a consequence,
firms end up to become more capital intensive.
The second case assumes that the operational cost varies along the time. In
particular, we assume that the operational cost is related to both the own capital
and the (past) average level of capital per firm.3 The idea is that the operational
technology may be endogenously improved in economies where each firm accounts for
and controls only a small amount of capital, and there is a process of diﬀusion of such
operational technology improvements. Now, a positive population growth enhances
economic growth but it is not necessary to experience growth. Positive economic
growth only needs improvements in the technology associated to operational costs in
order to compensate the negative eﬀects of entry due to the business-stealing eﬀect.
The number of firms grows positively but each one becomes more capital intensive
and at the same time smaller by hiring less capital and labor.4 The firm has always
the election between continuing with the old operational technology or adapting
to the new one with a diﬀerent operational cost. Since firms hire less capital, the
operational cost technology is improved and, therefore, firms end up choosing the
new technology. Assuming that the operational cost is not only positively related
to the average level of capital per firm, but also to the mean of the labor growth
used in a representative firm (what means that the operational cost depends on
the number of workers) or to the growth of the number of firms (what allows to
study either when the diﬃculty to exploit a new product increases with the number
of products or the opposite, when technology spreads with the number of firms),
such that the set of values satisfying this condition has an empty interior in the space of all possible
values”.
3In Peretto (1999), firms only use labor and directly engage in R&D expenditures in order to
improve the marginal productivity (or lower the marginal costs) of labor.
4A firm must be interpreted as a productive process.
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gives the same qualitative conclusions than in the case of the operational cost only
related to the average level of capital per firm. The results are consistent with the
finding of Jones (2002) about the inexistence of a relationship between growth and
the number of researchers. That the economy becomes more capital intensive in the
growth process has been recently stressed, among others, by Givon (2006), Zuleta
(2006) or List and Zhou (2007). However, and in contrast with these authors, our
economy does not need any intended R&D expenditure made by firms to save labor
in the production process. It is the evolution of the operational costs what makes
the economy to become more capital intensive.
In the models of endogenous growth typically production growth coincides with
consumption growth. In section 4 we show that a change in the sector that is
monopolistically competitive changes the results about the growth rate. We consider
an economy with diﬀerentiated consumption and investment goods. In particular, we
assume that the individual buys several diﬀerentiated final goods and derive utility
through a love of variety parameter from a mix of them, what we call eﬀective
consumption. Investment goods are produced by competitive firms through a mix
of final goods. There is no aggregate returns to specialization for the investment.
In this economy per capita production does not grow regardless of the assumed
operational cost. However, having the same amount of final goods per capita does
not mean that per capita eﬀective consumption (or welfare) does not grow. In other
words, real per capita production is the same but the subjective value the consumer
gives to the production grows. In particular, with constant operational costs we
have eﬀective consumption semiendogenous growth whereas with operational costs
positively related to the average capital per firm population growth is not necessary
to have eﬀective consumption growth.
Finally, we modify again in section 5 the industrial structure of the economy
and show that assuming both love of variety and aggregate returns to specialization
in the investment sector gives a diﬀerent positive final goods growth rate than the
eﬀective consumption one. We analyze when population growth is needed to have
both production and eﬀective consumption growth.
The exercise made in this paper shows that both the operational cost and the
particular industrial structure determines ultimately the pattern of growth. First, a
technological change aﬀecting the operational costs (ex. the promotion of technology
diﬀusion through a Marshallian industrial district) can have dramatic consequences
on economic growth by moving an economy from a semiendogenous to an endogenous
growth pattern. Second, the industrial or sectorial structure can explain at least part
of the economic growth5 and, at the same time, it can hide part of this growth, i.e.,
5An example, from a diﬀerent point of view, is Alonso-Carrera and Raurich (2006).
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the eﬀective consumption growth. Hence, accounting for growth should go beyond
a Solow residual decomposition exercise.
2 Profits, number of firms and economic growth
In this section, we show that monopolistic competition can generate endogenous
(semiendogenous) growth when the market structure evolves and becomes more
(remains equally) competitive as a consequence of an increase in the number of
firms. Assume there is a unique final good which is produced by competitive firms
using a continuum of intermediate goods. Total population bLt grows at a constant
rate, so that bLt/bLt−1 = n.
A final goods firm maximizes
Yt −
Z zt
0
pitxitdi, (1)
where xit and pit are the quantity and price of the intermediate good i in period
t, respectively, and zt is the total number of intermediate goods in period t, which
is taken as given by the (competitive) final goods sector. We have normalized the
final goods price to one. The production function Yt depends in a symmetric way
on the available intermediate goods, which are not perfect substitutes. Therefore,
from this profits maximization problem we can recover a demand function for each
intermediate good.
In each period, new intermediate goods producers may enter and produce a new
variety. Each firm produces at most one intermediate input xit. In order to operate,
firms have to pay an operational cost ψt. An intermediate goods firm i maximizes
πit = pitxit − wtLit − (1 + rt)Kit − ψt, (2)
where πit is the profits function, xit = K1−αit L
α
it, Kit and Lit are the capital and labor
used by firm i, respectively, wt is the wage, and rt is the interest rate, so that there
is complete depreciation. We have assumed that the operational cost is measured in
terms of the final good. Since intermediate goods are not perfect substitutes, firms in
the intermediate goods sector face a downward slopping demand curve which confers
them some degree of market power. Then, the profits function can be simplified to6
πit = ηpitK1−αit L
α
it − ψt, (3)
6We assume that the operational cost is completely out of the scope of the firm decisions. In
the next section, we study a more general case where the operational cost can partially depend on
the firm decisions.
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where η is the inverse of the elasticity of the demand for each intermediate good
and measures the degree of market power.
Since there is perfect competition in the final goods sector, in a symmetric equi-
librium where all firms produce the same output level xit = xt, with the same
quantity of inputs Kit = Kt and Lit = Lt, set the same price pit = pt, and have the
same profits πit = πt, we have that
Yt = ztptK1−αt L
α
t . (4)
There is free entry in the intermediate goods sector. Thus, the total number of
intermediate goods zt is determined by the zero profit condition and, hence, Eq.(3)
is equal to zero. Applying this condition to Eq.(4), the per capita final goods growth
can be written as7
gyt+1 =
gzt+1gψt+1
n
, (5)
where yt = Yt/bLt is per capita final goods production, and ght+1 = ht+1/ht denotes
the growth between t + 1 and t of the variable h. From Eq.(5) it is clear that
the particular pattern of growth depends on the assumed operational cost function.
Moreover, we could identify diﬀerent operational cost functions for either diﬀerent
historic times or diﬀerent degrees of development. Therefore, if we identify the
functional form of the cost function and the evolution of the number of firms, we
would be able to also identify the growth rate of the economy. Obviously, the number
of firms in the economy is the result of the free entry condition. Then, depending on
the nature of the operational cost, associated either to the same intermediate sector
or to another sector, we have diﬀerent growth mechanisms. Next, we show two of
the most popular cases of this mechanism when the operational cost is associated
to a third sector.
In the endogenous growthmodel of Romer (1990), the operational cost is assumed
to be constant and equal to the price of a patent, and the number of intermediate
firms coincides with the number of patents, which are produced in another sector.
Hence, by assuming that the number of patents evolves as
zt+1 − zt = δLz,tzt, (6)
where Lz,t is labor used to produce (or search) a new patent at t, and δ is a positive
constant, the per capita final goods growth becomes
gyt+1 =
1 + δLz,t
n
. (7)
7In national accounting, final goods production corresponds to the Gross Domestic Product,
i.e., Yt − ztψt. Since in this paper the dynamics of Yt is the same than the dynamics of Yt − ztψt,
hereinafter we concentrate on Yt.
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We need constant population for a balanced growth path to exist, i.e., Lz,t must be
fixed. Obviously, Lz,t comes from the free entry condition. If there is population
growth, then growth is not balanced, since Lz,t in Eq.(7) is permanently growing
whereas n is a constant. Moreover, without population growth, the country with
the biggest population would have the biggest Lz,t and, then, the biggest per capita
final goods growth. This is the reason why this model is said to have scale eﬀects.
In the endogenous growth model of Jones (1995), the operational cost is also
assumed to be equal to the price of a patent, but not necessarily constant, and
the number of intermediate firms coincides with the number of patents, which are
produced in another sector. In particular, it is assumed ψt = ψbLt, where ψ is a
positive constant. This in turn means that the price of a patent increases if and
only if population grows.8 The number of patents is assumed to evolve as
zt+1 − zt = δLz,tzφt lλ−1z,t , (8)
where lz,t is the mean of the labor used in a representative firm that produces
patents, i.e., an externality accruing from the duplication of R&D, and φ and λ are
constants. The parameter φ captures the fact that the stock of current patents can
aﬀect either positively or negatively the production of new patents. In a symmetric
equilibrium, where Lz,t = lz,t, the growth of the number of firms is
gzt+1 =
³
1 + δLλz,tz
φ−1
t
´
. (9)
Population cannot be constant in a balanced growth path, since therefore the growth
of the number of firms zt does not allow the factor 1+δLλz,tz
φ−1
t to be constant. Such
factor remains constant if gz = nλ/(1−φ). Rewriting Eq.(5), we have
gy = nλ/(1−φ). (10)
Hence, we need population growth for a balanced growth path to exist. This is
the reason why this model is said to be a semiendogenous growth model. When
population does not grow, the operational cost for the intermediate goods firms
collapses into a constant and, then, growth is not possible.
In order to realize the role of the operational cost in the determination of growth,
assume instead that ψt = ψlz,t. Then, in a symmetric equilibrium and a balanced
growth path, as both ztLz,t and ztLt are constant proportions of the total population,
we have from Eq.(5) that gy = 1 regardless of the number of patents accumulation
law given by Eq.(8). In this sense, we can say that the necessity in Jones (1995)
of the operational cost to depend on total population instead of the labor mean
employed by a firm denotes some type of scale eﬀect.
8It can be inferred from equations (A2) and (A15) in Jones (1995).
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Obviously, gzt depends on the assumed ψt. We detail this relationship in the
next section.
3 A cost-based model of endogenous growth
We construct an economy with aggregate returns to scale to analyze how the free
entry condition together with the particular evolution of the operational costs de-
termine the growth rate of the economy. In standard models (see Mankiw and
Whinston, 1986), free entry reduces welfare in the sense that the increase in the
aggregate operational costs is not compensated by the positive benefits arising from
increasing competition or business-stealing eﬀect: new firms entering the market
have a negative impact on the incumbent firms’ demand. Hence, the market equi-
librium can generate excessive entry. However, in the presence of increasing returns
to specialization the entrance of a new intermediate firm has a complementary ef-
fect: it increases the aggregate productivity and, thus, the incumbents’ demands.
Therefore, when considering the complementary eﬀect the free entry may yield an
ineﬃciently low number of firms. The evolution of the operational costs will de-
termine the new entry in the market and, thus, the aggregate productivity growth,
and at the same time the growth of the aggregate losses due to the presence of the
operational costs.
Final goods production: There is a unique final good which is produced by
competitive firms through a continuum of intermediate goods, with the following
technology (as in Benassy, 1996):9
Yt =
µ
zv(1−η)−ηt
Z zt
0
x1−ηit di
¶ 1
1−η
, η ∈ (0, 1), v ∈ (0, 1). (11)
In a symmetric equilibrium, all the firms in the intermediate goods sector produce
the same output level xt and, thus, aggregate output is Yt = zv+1t xt. Then, the
elasticity of output with respect to the number of firms zt is given by the “degree of
returns to specialization” v, as in Ethier (1982). This parameter measures the degree
to which society benefits from specializing production between a large number of
intermediate goods zt. As a result, an increase in the number of intermediate goods
improves the total factor productivity of the final goods technology. This formulation
allows to separate the eﬀect of the mark-up from the economies of scale.10 Since
9We maintain the same definition of the variables as in the previous section.
10The conventional formulation established by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) corresponds to the case
v = η/ (1− η) < 1, where there exists a one-to-one relationship between the market power and the
degree of returns to specialization.
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there is free entry in the intermediate goods sector, at the aggregate level the number
of intermediate goods zt is determined by the zero profits condition. However, the
representative firm in the final goods sector takes this value as given. From the
profits maximization problem, given by
max
{xit}
z
v(1−η)−η
1−η
t
µZ zt
0
x1−ηit di
¶ 1
1−η
−
Z zt
0
pitxitdi, (12)
we obtain the inverse demand function for each intermediate input,
xit = (pit)
− 1η z
v (1−η)η −1
t Yt. (13)
Intermediate goods production: Each intermediate goods firm solves
max
{pit,Kit,Lit}
πit = pitxit − (1 + rt)Kit − wtLit − ψt, (14)
subject to the final goods sector demand, Eq.(13), and where xit = K1−αit L
α
it. The
operational cost can depend partially on the firm decisions, but not completely.
Note that an operational cost means that there are goods neither consumed directly
by individuals nor invested in capital. We have assumed there is complete capital
depreciation.11 The associated first-order conditions of the firm problem yield
1 + rt = pit (1− η) (1− α)K−αit Lαit − ψKit , (15)
wt = pit (1− η)αK1−αit Lα−1it − ψLit , (16)
where ψh is the partial derivative of ψt with respect to h.
In a symmetric equilibrium final output is equal to
Yt = zv+1t K
1−α
t L
α
t , (17)
and the price, by substituting Eq.(17) into Eq.(13), is
pt = zvt . (18)
The free entry condition (each intermediate firm makes zero profits, i.e., πt = 0)
determines the number of firms. Formally, and using Eq.(18), we have
ηzvtK
1−α
t L
α
t = ψt − ψKtKt − ψLtLt. (19)
Since the final cost is defined in terms of the final output, the entry of any firm re-
duces the relative price between final output and intermediate goods 1/pt = z−vt and,
11Capital depreciation does not vary the qualitative results.
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thus, it makes entry more profitable. However, individual firms do not internalize
this (complementary) eﬀect. Note that in our model we obtain the standard formu-
lation where pt = 1 when v = 0. In this case, aggregate returns to specialization are
absent and, hence, there would be only one (normalized) firm.
Consumers: We assume Solow individuals: at any period t, each individual j
saves a constant fraction of her income Rjt and is endowed with one unit of labor
that she supplies inelastically. Therefore, savings for the individual j are
Sjt = sR
j
t , (20)
where s ∈ (0, 1) is the constant propensity to save.12
Labor market clearing condition: In equilibrium, labor demand and supply
coincides, i.e.,
ztLt = bLt. (21)
As population grows at a constant rate, we have
gzt+1gLt+1 = g?Lt+1 = n. (22)
Note that assuming another sector employing labor would modify the labor market
clearing condition and, thus, the particular industrial structure of the economy would
become crucial in determining the growth rate of the economy.
Capital market clearing condition: The amount saved by individuals at t
equals the stock of physical capital at t+ 1; i.e.,Z ?Lt
0
Sjt dj = s
Z ?Lt
0
Rjtdj = zt+1Kt+1. (23)
Noting that
R ?Lt
0
Rjtdj = wtbLt + (1 + rt) ztKt = zt [wtLt + (1 + rt)Kt] =
(1− η) zv+1t K1−αt Lαt − zt
¡
ψKtKt + ψLtLt
¢
, where we have used the definition of the
individuals income and Eqs (21), (15), (16) and (18), the previous equation becomes
s
£
(1− η) zv+1t K1−αt Lαt − zt
¡
ψKtKt + ψLtLt
¢¤
= zt+1Kt+1, (24)
or
s (Yt − ztψt) = zt+1Kt+1. (25)
Balanced growth path: The dynamics of the model can be reduced to the
capital accumulation Eq.(24) and the free entry condition Eq.(19), which using Eqs
(21) and (22) can be written as
ηn
gKt+1
gLt+1
= s
∙
(1− η) ψt
Kt
− ψKt − ψLt
Lt
Kt
¸
, (26)
12An infinite horizon consumer with CES preferences gives the same qualitative results.
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and
ηbLvtK−αt Lα−vt = ψtKt − ψKt − ψLt LtKt . (27)
Thus, for a balanced growth path to exist, from Eq.(26) we have that in equilibrium
the operational cost function must be asymptotically of the form
ψt =
1
(1− η)
£
HKt + ψKtKt + ψLtLt
¤
(28)
where H denotes a positive constant.13 In that case, from Eq.(27) we have
gL = g
α
α−v
K n
−v
α−v , (29)
and combining it with Eq.(26) gives
ηn
α
α−v g
−v
α−v
K = sH. (30)
From Eqs (17), (21) and (29), we obtain
gy =
µ
n
gK
¶ v
α−v
. (31)
For α > v, this equation clearly informs us about the negative (positive) eﬀect of the
capital per firm growth (population growth) on the growth of per capita output; i.e.,
small firms (or productive processes) are the source of growth. Thus, any mechanism
whose eﬀects are translated into gK < 0 will induce positive growth.14,15
Next, in order to complete the analysis, we assume a particular functional form
for the operational cost.
3.1 Homogeneous operational costs
Operational costs consist of resources that the firm consumes, i.e., they constitute
final goods that are neither consumed directly by individuals nor invested in capital.
We assume the following specification of the operational cost:
ψt = ψK
γξ
t L
γ(1−ξ)
t Φ ({kt−τ}∞τ=1) , (32)
13Note that Eq.(27) informs that ψt cannot be homogeneous of degree one in Kt and Lt, since
then there would be no equilibrium.
14Note that gK < 0 is compatible with more capital intensive firms. Also note that this result
depends crucially on the fact that the production function does not vary.
15Although capital per firm growth has the opposite sign than the output growth, we have a
balanced growth path because aggregate capital growth and output growth coincide.
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where kt−τ is the average level of capital per firm at period t− τ , ψ > 0, γ ∈ [0, 1)
and ξ ∈ [0, 1]. The function Φ is defined as Φ ({kt−τ}∞τ=1) = minτ=1,...,∞
n
kβt−τ
o
,
with β > 0. This means that the operational cost depends on how production has
been organized in the past. In particular, large productive structures are less able
to improve the operational technology than small ones. Moreover, at any time the
firm has always the election between continuing with the old technology or adapting
to the new one with a diﬀerent operational cost. However, in order to simplify
notation and since the economy will evolve such that kt−1 is decreasing, we directly
write Φ ({kt−τ}∞τ=1) = kβt−1. Note that this operational cost function is homogenous
of degree γ < 1 in Kt and Lt, but in aggregate it exhibits homogeneity of degree
γ + β. This formulation guarantees the existence of a balanced growth path as it
satisfies Eq.(28). Note that the cases in which γ 6= 0 mean that the firm realizes
that the operational cost partially depends on production.
In the Appendix we show both the existence and the stability properties of
the balanced growth path for any parameter configuration. Endogenous growth is
obtained if and only if γ + β = 1 and ξ = 1; i.e., the operational cost function is
homogeneous of degree one in aggregate with respect to kt−1 and Kt. Thus, the
usual knife-edge condition for endogenous growth to arise is reduced to the property
that operational costs must be “linear” on the average capital per firm. We next
illustrate the importance of the operational costs on economic growth through two
special cases: ψt = ψ and ψt = ψK
γ
t k
1−γ
t−1 .
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3.1.1 γ = β = 0
This parameter configuration gives a constant operational cost, i.e., ψt = ψ for
all t, as in Matsuyama (1995). This means that the operational cost is not only
independent of the produced quantity, but also on how the technology has been used
in the past. We need to assume that v < α in order to have convergence. This means
that if the aggregate returns to specialization are too high, the complementary eﬀect
can never be compensated by the business-stealing eﬀect and, then, multiplying
the number of firms simply by reducing the size of each firm makes growth to be
explosive. In this case, from Eq.(28) we have H = (1− η)ψ/Kt and, as it must
be asymptotically constant, the unique possible balanced growth path must satisfy
that Kt is asymptotically constant, so that gK = 1. From Eqs (29), (22) and (31),
16Other diﬀerent operational cost functions, as ψKγt k
β
t−1 (Lt/lt−1)
ε , where lt−1 is the average
level of labor per firm at period t − 1, ψKγt k
β
t−1 (lt/lt−1)
ε or ψKγt k
β
t−1 (Lt/lt−1)
ε (zt/zt−1)
ϕ give
the same qualitative conclusions.
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we obtain
gK = 1, gz = n
α
α−v ,
gL = n
−v
α−v , gy = n
v
α−v . (33)
Finally, Eq.(30) yields K = s (1− η)ψ/ηn αα−v . The economy experiences semien-
dogenous growth. When population grows, the number of firms grows at a positive
rate and labor demand per firm grows at a negative rate. Thus, firms become
smaller and more capital-intensive, implying a higher labor productivity, which in
turn makes per capita growth to increase. Note that not only the productivity
of labor increases, but also the productivity of capital can increase because of the
complementary eﬀect. If there is no population growth, then any variable grows
regardless of the returns to specialization.
3.1.2 ξ = 1 and β = 1− γ
This parameter configuration means that the operational cost is only related to the
capital per firm, i.e., ψt = ψK
γ
t k
1−γ
t−1 . In equilibrium, where kt−1 = Kt−1,17 we have
H = ψgγ−1K (1− η − γ), which in turn does impose the restriction γ+ η < 1 to have
a positive balanced growth path. We need to assume that v < α (1− γ) / (2− γ) in
order to have convergence. Eqs (30), (29), (22) and (31) yield
gK = D−(α−v)n
−α
α(1−γ)−v(2−γ) , gz = Dαn
α(2−γ)
α(1−γ)−v(2−γ) ,
gL = D−αn
−[v(2−γ)+α]
α(1−γ)−v(2−γ) , gy = Dvn
v(2−γ)
α(1−γ)−v(2−γ) , (34)
where D = [η/sψ (1− γ − η)]
1
α(1−γ)−v(2−γ) . The economy experiences a combina-
tion of endogenous growth and semiendogenous growth. In case of zero population
growth, we have positive growth if ψ < η/s (1− γ − η) . We need a suﬃciently low
unit operational cost in order that firms enter the market. Otherwise, the opera-
tional cost cannot be compensated by profits. With positive growth, the number
of firms increases but each firm hires less capital and labor, such that they become
more capital intensive. The complementary eﬀect due to the growth in the number
of firms dominates the business-stealing eﬀect (less production per firm), which in
turn makes production per capita to grow. Population growth reinforces the mag-
nitude of each growth rate. The fact that labor and capital per firm grows at a
negative rate regardless of the population growth means that the operational cost
decreases and, therefore, firms choose the new technology.18 However, note that
17If instead of kt−1 we have kt by assuming Φ ({kt−τ}∞τ=0) then there would be no dynamics.
18Alternatively, we could think that technology becomes more standard or, what is the same,
that knowledge diﬀusion is faster and, then, the operational cost associated to create a new firm
decreases.
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gzgψt > 1, which means that the aggregate operational cost increases.
4 Monopolistic competition in the final goods sec-
tor
By the problem of economic development I mean simply the problem
of accounting for the observed pattern, across countries and across time,
in levels and rates of growth of per capita income. This may seem too
narrow a definition, and perhaps it is, but thinking about income pat-
terns will necessarily involve us in thinking about many other aspects of
societies too, so I would suggest that we withhold judgment on the scope
of this definition until we have a clearer idea of where it leads us. (R.E.
Lucas, Jr., 1988, p. 3)
In this section, we show that a diﬀerent industrial structure dramatically changes
the interpretation of the results obtained regarding growth. In particular, we show
that accounting for the observed pattern in levels and rates of growth of per capita
income does not necessarily explain economic development. We consider a formula-
tion with diﬀerentiated consumption and investment goods. In particular, we assume
that the individual j buys several diﬀerentiated final goods and derives utility from
the following mix, that we call eﬀective consumption,
cjt =
µ
zv(1−η)−ηt
Z zt
0
¡
xjcit
¢1−η di¶ 11−η , η ∈ (0, 1) , v ∈ (0, 1) , (35)
where xjcit is the final good produced by firm i and consumed by individual j, and now
v is a love of variety parameter. Investment goods, It, are produced by competitive
firms through the following technology:
It =
µ
z−ηt
Z zt
0
x1−ηIit di
¶ 1
1−η
, η ∈ (0, 1) , (36)
where xIit is the final good produced by firm i used to produce investment goods.
Note that in order to concentrate on the love of variety we have assumed that there
is no aggregate returns to specialization for the investment. Also note that the same
varieties are used to consume and to produce investment goods and that both share
the inverse of the elasticity of the demand for each intermediate good η.
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Consumers: Since individuals save a constant fraction of their income, each
individual solves
max
{{xcit}zti=0}∞t=0
∞X
t=0
βt
µ
zv(1−η)−ηt
Z zt
0
¡
xjcit
¢1−η di¶ 11−η (37)
s.to
Z zt
0
pitxjcitdi = (1− s)R
j
t . (38)
The first order condition is
βt
¡
cjt
¢η
zv(1−η)−ηt
¡
xjcit
¢−η
= λtpit, ∀i, (39)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated to Eq.(38). From Eq.(39) we have
xjcmt =
µ
pit
pmt
¶ 1
η
xjcit , ∀i,m. (40)
In order to recover each individual good demand, combine Eqs (38) and (40) to getZ zt
0
pmtxjcmtdm =
Z zt
0
p
1− 1η
mt p
1
η
itx
j
citdm = p
1
η
itx
j
cit
Z zt
0
p
1− 1η
mt dm = (1− s)Rjt , (41)
where the second equality comes from the fact that good i is infinitesimal. From
this equation we have the good i demand asZ ?Lt
0
xjcitdj =
⎛
⎝(1− s)
R ?Lt
0
RjtdjR zt
0
p
1− 1η
mt dm
⎞
⎠ p−
1
η
it . (42)
Savings are used by the individuals to buy investment goods that are rented to
the final goods production firms.
Investment goods production: Each firm solves
max
{xIit}zti=0
PItIt −
Z zt
0
pitxIitdi (43)
subject to Eq.(36), and where PIt is the price of the investment good. The inverse
demand function for each intermediate good is
xIit =
µ
pit
PIt
¶− 1η
z−1t It. (44)
Final goods production: Each firm solves
max
{pit,Kit,Lit}
pit
ÃZ ?Lt
0
xjcitdj + xIit
!
− PIt (1 + rt)Kit − wtLit − PItψt, (45)
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s.to
Z ?Lt
0
xjcitdj + xIit = K
1−α
it L
α
it, (46)
and Eqs (42) and (44), where Kit denotes the investment goods rented to the firm
by the individuals.19 The associated first-order conditions of the firm problem yield
PIt (1 + rt) = pit (1− η) (1− α)K−αit Lαit − PItψKit , (47)
wt = pit (1− η)αK1−αit Lα−1it − PItψLit . (48)
In the symmetric equilibrium, xjcit = x
j
ct, xIit = xIt and pit = pt for all i. Note that
this implies that xcit = xct, i.e., all the aggregate demands are equal. Substituting
Eq.(36) into Eq.(44) gives the relative prices
PIt = pt. (49)
As in the previous section, we consider one final good pit as the numéraire and
normalize its price to one.20 Hence, we have that pt = PIt = 1, and final output is
equal to
Yt = ztK1−αt L
α
t . (50)
The free entry condition yields
ηK1−αt L
α
t = ψt − ψKtKt − ψLtLt. (51)
Capital market clearing condition: Since now the investment goods have a
price, the condition becomesZ ?Lt
0
Sjt dj = s
Z ?Lt
0
Rjtdj = PItzt+1Kt+1. (52)
Noting that
R ?Lt
0
Rjtdj = wtbLt + PIt (1 + rt) ztKt = zt [wtLt + PIt (1 + rt)Kt] =
(1− η) ztK1−αt Lαt − zt
¡
ψKtKt + ψLtLt
¢
, where we have substituted for the prices,
the condition becomes
s
£
(1− η) ztK1−αt Lαt − zt
¡
ψKtKt + ψLtLt
¢¤
= zt+1Kt+1. (53)
Consumption: From Eqs (35) and (38) we have
cjt = z
v+1
t x
j
ct = z
v
t (1− s)Rjt . (54)
19We have measured the operational cost in terms of the investment good in order to analyze
the cases where the operational cost is completely out of the scope of the firm.
20Alternatively, we could assume that the numéraire is the investment good price, PIt = 1.
Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium monopolistic firms choose their prices such that they are
also one.
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Aggregating, and using Eq.(53), we have
bLtct = Z ?Lt
0
cjtdj = z
v
t (1− s)
Z ?Lt
0
Rjtdj =
(1− s) zvt zt+1Kt+1
s
, (55)
where ct is the eﬀective consumption per capita.
Balanced growth path: As in the previous section, both the free entry and the
capital accumulation conditions determine the dynamics of the economy. Combining
Eqs (22), (53) and (51), these conditions can be written as
ηn
gKt+1
gLt+1
= s
∙
(1− η) ψt
Kt
− ψKt − ψLt
Lt
Kt
¸
, (56)
and
ηK1−αt L
α
t = ψt − ψKtKt − ψLtLt. (57)
These conditions are the same as Eqs (26) and (27), evaluated with a diﬀerent price
for the intermediate goods. Hence, the properties regarding existence and stability
are the same than those of the previous section. Therefore, combining Eqs (51) and
(22) give
gK = gL, (58)
gzgK = n. (59)
From Eqs (55) and (59) we obtain
gc =
µ
n
gK
¶v
. (60)
And Eqs (50), (51) and (59) yield
gy = 1. (61)
Hence, the economy does not grow regardless of the assumed operational cost. How-
ever, having the same amount of final goods per capita does not mean that per capita
eﬀective consumption does not grow. We illustrate this assertion through the same
two operational costs of the previous section.
γ = β = 0: If ψt = ψ for all t, then we have
gK = gL = 1, gz = n, gc = nv. (62)
Eq.(56) determines the level of capital per firm. The economy experiences semien-
dogenous eﬀective consumption growth. Once capital per worker has been fixed, the
size of the firms does not vary with the population growth, but it does the number of
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firms. As a result, although the amount of consumption of each good decreases, the
total amount of goods consumed remains unchanged and the eﬀective consumption
increases due to the love of variety parameter.
ξ = 1 and β = 1− γ: If ψt = ψKγt k1−γt−1 , then we have
gK = gL = G−1n
−1
1−γ , gz = Gn
2−γ
1−γ ,
gc = Gvn
v(2−γ)
1−γ , (63)
where G = [η/sψ (1− η − γ)]1/(1−γ). The economy experiences endogenous and
semiendogenous eﬀective consumption growth.
Discussing prices and output growth: In this economy, growth of final
goods (zero) does not coincide with growth of the individual eﬀective consumption
(positive). In other words, real production is the same but the subjective value the
consumer gives to the production grows. In the market, per capita expenditure in
consumption
R zt
0
pitxjcitdi remains unchanged. The reason is that in adding diﬀerent
goods up, we need to use relative prices and, then, to measure output in units of one
specific good. In the literature, it is typically assumed an eﬀective consumption price
index Pct.21,22 In our case, we would have Pct = ptz
−v
t , so that if we measure in units
of eﬀective consumption then gy = gc. The main problem with this unit of measure
is that it does not exist as a good in the economy and, then, there is no economic
reason why goods should be measured in terms of a good that does not exist in
the economy. Moreover, if we consider a diﬀerent love of variety parameter for each
individual, then each individual has her own price index, and it would be impossible
to find out an aggregate price index. On the other hand, since the prices of all the
goods of this economy are the same, a direct estimation of the national product
would give no growth at all. Nevertheless, this particular economic structure shows
that the way production is measured by the current governments underestimates
real (eﬀective consumption) growth. Thus, accounting for the observed pattern in
levels and rates of growth of per capita income does not necessaily explain economic
development.
5 Love of variety and aggregate returns to scale
Next, we show that assuming both love of variety and aggregate returns to scale
in the investment sector gives a diﬀerent positive final goods growth rate than the
21In particular, in our economy it would be Pct = z
−v+η/(1−η)
t
³R zt
0
p(η−1)/ηit di
´η/(η−1)
.
22An example of eﬀective consumption without love of variety is Peretto (1998).
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eﬀective consumption one. In particular, we assume that individuals eﬀective con-
sumption is
cjt =
µ
zvc(1−η)−ηt
Z zt
0
¡
xjcit
¢1−η di¶ 11−η , η ∈ (0, 1) , vc ∈ (0, 1) , (64)
and that investment goods are produced through the following technology:
It =
µ
zvI(1−η)−ηt
Z zt
0
x1−ηIit di
¶ 1
1−η
, vI ∈ (0, 1) , (65)
where vc and vI are the love of variety and the aggregate returns to specialization
parameters, respectively. This model nests the economy of the previous sections.
For this reason we skip all the steps.
Balanced growth path: If one final good is the numéraire, then pt = 1 and
PIt = z
−vI
t . In the balanced growth path, we have the following relationships:
ηn
α
α−vI g
−vI
α−vI
K = s
∙
(1− η) ψt
Kt
− ψKt + ψLt
Lt
Kt
¸
, (66)
gz = g
− αα−vI
K n
α
α−vI , (67)
gc = g
−αvc−vI (1−α)
α−vI
K n
vI (1−α)+αvc
α−vI , (68)
gy = g
− vI (1−α)α−vI
K n
vI (1−α)
α−vI . (69)
γ = β = 0: If ψt = ψ for all t, then we have gK = 1, and
gz = n
α
α−vI , gL = n
−vI
α−vI ,
gy = n
vI (1−α)
α−vI , gc = n
vI (1−α)+vcα
α−vI , (70)
where vI < α in order to have convergence. The economy experiences semiendoge-
nous final goods growth and semiendogenous eﬀective consumption growth, but the
last is greater than the final goods growth.
ξ = 1 and β = 1− γ: If ψt = ψKγt k1−γt−1 , then we have
gK =MvI−αnα, gz =Mαn
α(2−γ)
α(1−γ)−vI (2−γ) , gL =M−αn
−α−vI (2−γ)
α(1−γ)−vI (2−γ) ,
gy =MvI(1−α)n
vI (1−α)
2
α−vI , gc =MvI(1−α)+vcαn
vI (1−α)
2+α(1−α)vc
α−vI , (71)
where M = [η/sψ (1− η − γ)]
1
α(1−γ)−vI (2−γ) and vI < α (1− γ) / (2− γ) in order
to have convergence. The economy experiences endogenous and semiendogenous
growth for both final goods and eﬀective consumption, but again eﬀective consump-
tion growth is greater than final goods growth.
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6 Concluding remarks
The main contribution of this paper is to stress the importance of the evolution of
operational costs, as they alter the market structure of the economy, which in turn
determines the growth pattern. Moreover, also the industrial structure has been
found to be crucial when interpreting growth. In particular, we show that a real per
capita production growth can be diﬀerent than the per capita eﬀective consumption
growth or the subjective value the consumer gives to production.
We still know not much about growth. We need to investigate more on the
relationship between technology, market structure and preferences. Also, factors
as human capital or public infrastructures could accelerate an industrial structure
change. Obviously, the endogeneization of the mark-up, diﬀerent mark-ups for dif-
ferent sectors, or diﬀerent economic structures, would shed more light about this
relationship.
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Appendix
Existence and stability of the balanced growth
path
Applying the operational cost Eq.(32) to the free entry condition Eq.(19) we
have
ηzvtK
1−α
t L
α
t = (1− γ)ψt. (A.1)
Combining Eqs (24), (32) and (A.1) gives
zts
µ
1− γ − η
η
¶
ψt = zt+1Kt+1. (A.2)
Using Eqs (32) and (21), Eqs (A.1) and (A.2) transform in equilibrium into
bLvtK1−α−γξt Lα−v−γ(1−ξ)t K−βt−1 = (1− γ)ψη , (A.3)
sψ
µ
1− γ − η
η
¶ bLtLγ(1−ξ)−1t Kγξt Kβt−1 = bLt+1L−1t+1Kt+1. (A.4)
In view of Eq.(A.3), the following result is immediate.
Proposition 1 When α− v − γ (1− ξ) = 0 and v 6= 1− γ − β, then
1. gK = n−v/(1−v−γ−β).
2. The balanced growth path is stable if β/ (1− v − γ) ∈ (−1, 1).
In case that α− v − γ (1− ξ) 6= 0, substituting Lt from Eq.(A.3) into Eq.(A.4),
and after applying growth rates, yields
F
¡
gKt+1 , gKt, gKt−1
¢
= n−E1g−βE2Kt−1 g
E3+β
Kt g
−E4
Kt+1 = 1, (A.5)
where E1 = vγ (1− ξ) , E2 = 1−α+v, E3 = (1− γ) (1− α)−vγξ, andE4 = 1−v−γ.
We concentrate on gKt since if it exists, Eq.(31) informs that gyt exists, too. Defining
E5 = −βE2+E3+β−E4, note that Eq.(A.5) allows to calculate the balanced growth
path only when E5 6= 0. In case that E5 = 0, the balanced growth path may either
not exist or it cannot be inferred from Eq.(A.5).
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Proposition 2 If E5 = 0 and E1 6= 0 and n 6= 1, then no balanced growth path
exists.
Proposition 3 If E5 6= 0 then gK = nE1/E5.
Note that the case γ = β = 0, implying that E1 = 0, belongs to the last
Proposition. Next, we show suﬃcient conditions for the balanced growth path to be
stable when E5 6= 0. The first order Taylor’s expansion around the balanced growth
path is
P1 (g, g, g) = F (g, g, g) + FgKt+1 (g, g, g)
¡
gKt+1 − g
¢
+
+ FgKt (g, g, g) (gKt − g) + FgKt−1 (g, g, g)
¡
gKt−1 − g
¢
, (A.6)
where FgKt+1 (g, g, g) = −E4F (g, g, g) g
−1; FgKt (g, g, g) = [E3 + β]F (g, g, g) g
−1;
and FgKt−1 (g, g, g) = −βE2F (g, g, g) g
−1. Thus, the linearized diﬀerential equations
can be written as
P1 (g, g, g)− F (g, g, g) = 0 = −E4gKt+1 + [E3 + β] gKt − βE2gKt−1 − gE5. (A.7)
For the case E4 6= 0, defining Nt = Kt−1 yields
∙
gKt+1
gNt+1
¸
=
"
−gE5E4
0
#
+
"
E3+β
E4
−βE2
E4
1 0
# ∙
gKt
gNt
¸
, (A.8)
which eigenvalues satisfy
p(λ) = λ2 + bλ+ c = 0, (A.9)
where b = − (E3 + β) /E4 and c = βE2/E4. Since E2 > 0, it is immediate that
E4 < 0 implies that p(λ) has real solutions. In this case, stability is assured as far
as p(−1) > 0 and p(1) > 0, since p(0) = c < 0; i.e., 1− b+ c > 0 and 1 + b+ c > 0.
As E4 < 0, the previous inequalities can be written as E4+E3+β (1 +E2) < 0 and
E4 −E3 − β (1− E2) < 0. Thus, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4 If E 6= 0 and E4 < 0, a balanced growth path is stable whenever
β < − (E4 +E3) / (1 +E2) and either
1. E2 < 1 and β > (E4 −E3) / (1−E2), or
2. E2 > 1 and β < (E4 −E3) / (1−E2), or
3. E2 = 1 and E4 − E3 < 0.
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When E5 6= 0 and E4 > 0, as c > 0, p(λ) may have either real or complex solu-
tions. If solutions are complex, they are λ = (−b/2)± i (c− b2/4)1/2 and, therefore,
the square of the absolute value of the module is c. Hence, stability occurs whenever
c < 1. For the case of real solutions, since p(0) = c > 0, the requirement is either23
0 < −b/2 < 1 and 1 + b+ c > 0, or −1 < −b/2 < 0 and 1− b+ c > 0.
Proposition 5 If E 6= 0 and E4 > 0, a balanced growth path is stable whenever
1. The solutions of p(λ) are complex, i.e., (E3 + β)
2 < 4βE2E4, and β < E4/E2.
2. The solutions of p(λ) are real, i.e., (E3 + β)
2 > 4βE2E4, and
(a) β > −E3 and β < 2E4 − E3and either
i. E2 < 1 and β < (E4 −E3) / (1−E2) .
ii. E2 > 1 and β > (E4 −E3) / (1−E2) .
iii. E2 = 1 and E4 − E3 > 0.
(b) β < −E3 and β > −2E4 − E3and β > − (E4 +E3) / (1 +E2) .
Proposition 6 If E5 6= 0 and E4 = 0 we distinguish two situations:
1. E3 + β = 0 or βE2 = 0, in which cases we have stability (no transition).
2. E3 + β 6= 0 and βE2 6= 0 and thus the balanced growth path is stable if
βE2/ (E3 + β) ∈ (−1, 1) .
WhenE5 = 0 and eitherE1 = 0 or n = 1, we have to check each possible case. We
concentrate onE5 = 0 andE1 = 0.This happens when (1− β) (v − α)+γ (α− vξ) =
0 and either ξ = 1 or γ = 0, which gives six possible cases. However, the cases ξ = 1,
v = α and β 6= 1 − γ; ξ = 1, v = α and β = 1 − γ; γ = 0, v = α and β 6= 1; and
γ = 0, v = α and β = 1 belong to Proposition 1. Thus, we analyze the other two
cases.
If ξ = 1, β = 1 − γ and v 6= α, combining Eqs (A.2) and (32), evaluating in
equilibrium, and applying growth rates, gives
sψ
µ
1− γ − η
η
¶
gγ−1Kt = gzt+1gKt+1 . (A.10)
23These conditions guarantee that p(λ) attains a minimim in (0, 1) and p (1) > 0, respectively,
or the minimum is in (−1, 0) and p (−1) > 0.
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And from Eqs (A.1), (21) and (32), evaluating in equilibrium, and applying growth
rates, we obtain
gv−αzt+1n
α = gγ+α−1Kt+1 g
1−γ
Kt . (A.11)
From these two equations we have
gKt+1 =
∙
sψ
µ
1− γ − η
η
¶¸ α−v
1−γ−v
n
−α
1−γ−v g
(1−γ)(1+v−α)
1−γ−v
Kt , (A.12)
from where
gK =
∙
η
sψ (1− γ − η)
¸ −(α−v)
α(1−γ)−v(2−γ)
n
−α
α(1−γ)−v(2−γ) , (A.13)
and the economy converges to a unique stable balanced growth path when
0 <
(1− γ) (1 + v − α)
1− γ − v < 1, (A.14)
i.e.,
v (2− γ) < α (1− γ) . (A.15)
If γ = 0, β = 1 and v 6= α, combining Eqs (A.10) and (A.11) with γ = 0 gives
gKt+1 =
∙
sψ (1− η)
η
¸α−v
1−v
n
−α
1−v g
1+v−α
1−v
Kt , (A.16)
from where
gK =
∙
sψ (1− η)
η
¸ α−v
α−2v
n
−α
α−2v , (A.17)
which is stable if
−1 < 1 + v − α
1− v < 1. (A.18)
Proposition 7 When ξ = 1, β = 1− γ and v 6= α, then
1. gK = [η/sψ (1− γ − η)]−(α−v)/[α(1−γ)−v(2−γ)] n−α/[α(1−γ)−v(2−γ)].
2. The balanced growth path is stable if v (2− γ) < α (1− γ).
Proposition 8 When γ = 0, β = 1 and v 6= α, then
1. gK = [sψ (1− η) /η](α−v)/(α−2v) n−α/(α−2v).
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2. The balanced growth path is stable if (1 + v − α) / (1− v) ∈ (−1, 1) .
The particular parameter combinations of the last two propositions are called
knife-edge conditions by Christiaans (2004). He shows that the knife-edge conditions
are consequence of the need to have a system of linear equations in order to have
endogenous growth. But he does not wonder where they come from. In our case,
we are simply assuming that the operational cost is a Cobb-Douglas function.
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